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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the impact of Bad Debt Loss Insurance on
settlement outcomes. A huge success in a settlement or trial may turn
into a disaster when the defendant goes bankrupt. “Rainmakers” face
the following dilemma: the greater the success in court, the greater
the defendant’s bankruptcy risk.
The starting point of our paper is a simple trial and litigation
model with perfect and complete information. We add the possibil-
ity of a defendant’s bankruptcy as well as Bad Debt Loss Insurance
for both the settlement and the trial stage. We demonstrate that
trial insurance and settlement insurance may have diﬀerent impacts
on the outcome of settlement negotiations. Trial insurance tends to
increase the settlement result; therefore, it generates a contract rent
for the insurer and the insured. Settlement insurance, however, can
under certain conditions have the opposite eﬀect: it may decrease the
settlement result.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of Bad Debt Loss Insurance (BDLI) on the
trial and settlement behavior of creditors. BDLI covers the creditor’s loss if
his debtor goes bankrupt. In the typical BDLI case, the creditor has delivered
a good and expects the due payment, but the debtor goes bankrupt before
acquitting his debt. This type of BDLI case is independent of whether or
not the creditor takes legal action.1
Successful legal action may as well lead to claims with a risk of bankruptcy. If
a dispute about contractual obligations or in a tort case has arisen between
two parties, then one party demands an amount of money from the other
and threatens to go to court. Before a trial, the parties may negotiate a
settlement. If the plaintiﬀ prevails in court, or if the parties conclude a
settlement, then the plaintiﬀ has an enforceable claim against the defendant.
However, the defendant may declare bankruptcy before payment is collected.
This is the type of BDLI case we are interested in.
Ironically, the bankruptcy risk is greater, the greater the success in court.
A landslide victory may turn into a disaster if the defendant’s bankruptcy
dramatically decreases the amount that can be collected. This is the subject
of the novel “The Rainmaker” by John Grisham (1996): even tough the
rainmaker, a young lawyer, has achieved an enormous award in his ﬁrst trial,
he did not collect any money, since the defendant was closed down after the
trial. In such a case, the plaintiﬀ does not receive the awarded judgement or
the agreed-upon settlement, and he still has to pay his litigation costs.
Under the British cost allocation rule, the prevailing plaintiﬀ would receive
reimbursement for his litigation costs from his opponent. If, however, the
latter goes bankrupt, then the prevailing plaintiﬀ even has to bear his own
costs (including the full amount of court fees). A similar risk awaits the
plaintiﬀ if he concludes a settlement. Even in this case, the defendant may
go bankrupt. At least, the plaintiﬀ does not have to bear the litigation costs.
But still, the expected value of a settlement award is smaller than in a world
without bankruptcy.
We deﬁne as “trial insurance” a Bad Debt Loss Insurance that covers the
plaintiﬀ’s risk of the defendant’s bankruptcy after having prevailed in court.
In the same vein, we deﬁne “settlement insurance” as insurance which covers
the risk of a defendant’s bankruptcy after a settlement agreement. At the
ﬁrst glance, the bankruptcy risks for trial and settlement appear to be very
1Often the BDLI insurer requires him to do so.
2similar. However, it is remarkable that insurers in reality only oﬀer trial
insurance, while settlement insurance seems to be non-existent.
Our model allows for a separate analysis of the impact trial and settlement
insurance have on the settlement result (according to the symmetric Nash
bargaining solution). We demonstrate that trial insurance is a “strategic
insurance”: according to Kirstein (2000), a strategic insurance is a device to
improve the strategic situation between plaintiﬀ and defendant to the beneﬁt
of the former.2 The driving force of strategic insurance is the modiﬁcation
of the plaintiﬀ’s threat point in settlement negotiations.3 The consequence
of such a strategic move is an exploitation of the defendant. Hence, strategic
insurance creates a cooperation rent between insurer and plaintiﬀ even if
both parties are risk-neutral.
Our model shows, however, that settlement insurance may fail to create
a mutual beneﬁt when both the insurer and the plaintiﬀ are risk-neutral.
This would explain the non-existence of settlement insurance (while trial
insurance can be found on the market). Another aspect of the model may
be of theoretical interest. The possibility of bankruptcy after a settlement
agreement has various impacts on the symmetric Nash bargaining solution:
the higher the agreed-upon amount, the greater the bankruptcy risk. Thus,
the interests of the two parties are not always strictly opposed, as is the case
in the bargaining model without bankruptcy.
A few papers have analyzed Bad Debt Loss Insurance (BDLI): Thakor (1982)
proposes BDLI as a signal to overcome a lemon market problem. The insurer,
as a third party between borrower and lender, may produce informative sig-
nals. Borrowers can thereby signal their default probability to lenders.4 The
then popular theory according to which the purchase of BDLI constitutes a
valid signal to borrowers was, however, questioned by Hsueh/Li (1990). This
stream of literature is, however, not concerned with the strategic eﬀect of
BDLI which was explained above and is the topic of our paper.
In section 2, we present a simple litigation model with perfect and complete
information that consists of a settlement and a trial stage. Furthermore, we
add the possibility of bankruptcy to both stages. In section 3, the trial stage
is analyzed, with and without trial insurance. We derive the conditions under
which the threat to sue is credible or not. Section 4 presents the analysis
2See also Velthoeven/van Wijck (2001).
3Kirstein/Rickman (2004) present a model which also allows the plaintiﬀ to increase
his threat points by a strategic move prior to settlement negotiations.
4This signaling eﬀect has been empirically estimated by Kidwell/Sorensen/Wachowicz
(1987).
3of the settlement stage. Here we demonstrate the eﬀect of bankruptcy and
settlement insurance on the Nash bargaining solution. The ﬁnal section draws
conclusions.
2 Outline of the model
2.1 A simple model of bankruptcy
We consider a simple model in which a plaintiﬀ (P) and a defendant (D)
negotiate a settlement. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the plaintiﬀ
may proceed to trial, in which case a judge decides the dispute with an
exogenously given probability (denoted as β) in favor of the plaintiﬀ.5
Thus, the dispute leads to one of four possible outcomes:
1. a settlement agreement,
2. the plaintiﬀ drops the case,
3. the plaintiﬀ prevails in court,
4. the plaintiﬀ loses in court.
In two of these outcomes, the plaintiﬀ receives a claim against the defendant:
if the parties settle the case, or if the plaintiﬀ prevails. In each of the four
cases, the actual value of the defendant’s assets is the realization of a ran-
dom variable. This actual value may turn out to be smaller than the debt
of the defendant (consisting of the plaintiﬀ’s claim plus the litigation cost
to be borne by the defendant). In this case, the defendant has to declare
bankruptcy.
Let A ≥ 0 denote the realization of the random variable representing the
value of the defendant’s asset. We assume that this random variable has a






5For a model in which the probability of prevailing in court depends on the underlying
behavior of the parties, see Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997).
4Let us furthermore denote as α(z) the probability that the actual value of
the defendant’s asset A is below a certain value z > 0:




Later on, we have to distinguish two conditional expected values of the asset
value. Let X(z) denote the conditional expected value of the asset, given














Note that X = α(z)X(z)+[1−α(z)]X(z). Figure 1 visualizes our approach
for an arbitrary distribution function f(A).
Figure 1: Conditional expected values X,X and probability α
-
6 f(A)
A z X(z) X(z)
α(z)
1 − α(z)
52.2 A simple litigation and settlement game
Now we model a litigation and settlement game between two risk-neutral
parties (thus they maximize their monetary income). The model assumes
perfect and complete information (including the fact whether the plaintiﬀ is
insured or not), in order to keep the analysis tractable.
We use the British litigation cost allocation rule, according to which the
losing party has to bear both sides’ litigation costs. The whole analysis
could just as well be carried out using the American cost allocation rule.
However, in the case of the British rule, the bankruptcy risk of the defendant
is higher as it also includes the defendant’s litigation cost. Even though the
British rule makes the loser pay, in case of a losing defendant’s bankruptcy,
the court would turn to the prevailing plaintiﬀ to collect the litigation costs.6
We denote the sum of both parties’ costs as C and the amount at stake as
Y . To derive the settlement result, we use the symmetric Nash bargaining
solution; the transfer payment is labeled S. We assume that bargaining is
costless. Figure 2 demonstrates the sequence of the interaction as well as
the resulting payoﬀs.
The game starts with settlement negotiations between P and D. If they agree
upon a settlement result, nature draws the random value of D’s asset. If
this value exceeds the settlement result, which occurs with a probability of
1 − α(S), then D pays the agreed-upon amount to P and the game ends
(endnode 1). If the realization of the asset value is smaller than the agreed-
upon payment - the probability of this event is α(S) - then an uninsured
P claims this asset value and D is down to zero (endnode 2).7 If, however,
P is fully insured, then he receives the whole settlement payment (and the
insurer may claim D’s asset). Note that the probability of a bankruptcy
depends on the agreed-upon settlement result, the amount of which may
depend on whether P is insured or not.
When the parties fail to settle, then P has to decide whether to bring the
case to court or not. If he drops the case, the game ends without any transfer
payment between the parties, and without litigation costs (endnode 3). If P
proceeds to court, the judge (denoted as J) decides the case. If he decides
6To keep matters simple, we do not distinguish between court fees and attorneys’ fees.
To be more precise: in case of the defendant’s bankruptcy, a prevailing plaintiﬀ only has to
pay his own litigation costs and the court fees, but not the fees of the defendant’s attorney.
7This implies that P is the only creditor. If multiple creditors hold claims against D,
then the creditors would receive only a fraction of the asset value, net of the costs involved.
Taking this into account would, however, only strengthen our argument.
6Figure 2: Sequence of interactions




























in favor of D, which occurs with probability 1 − β, then the game ends.
In this case, no transfer payment is due, but now P has to bear both sides
litigation costs (endnode 4). In case the plaintiﬀ prevails (probability β), then
the asset value is choosen randomly (the node is labeled N) and whether
the judgement drives the defendant into bankruptcy. This happens with
probability α(Y + C). With 1 − α(Y + C), the defendant survives and is
able to pay his debts. The bankruptcy probability is independent of P’s
insurance status. To economize on notation, we denote α(Y + C) as α. The
probability of prevailing in court (β) is assumed to be independent of the
players’ behavior.
In case of a bankruptcy, an uninsured P only receives the defendant’s asset
and has to bear the litigation costs (endnode 6). If he is fully or partial
insured, then he receives the amount at stake from the insurer. Finally, if no
bankruptcy occurs, P receives the amount at stake (endnode 5).
Table 1 comprises the payoﬀ vectors for the case of an uninsured plaintiﬀ,
7Table 1: Payoﬀs in game without insurance
endnode probability P’s payoﬀ D’s payoﬀ
1 α(S) X(S) 0
2 1 − α(S) S X(S) − S
3 - 0 X
4 1 − β −C X
5 β[1 − α(Y + C)] Y X(Y + C) − (Y + C)
6 βα(Y + C) X(Y + C) − C 0
Table 2: Modiﬁed payoﬀs with insurance
endnode probability P’s payoﬀ D’s payoﬀ
1 α(S) S 0
6 βα(Y + C) Y 0
while the subsequent table 2 presents the modiﬁcations if the plaintiﬀ has
settlement (line 1) or trial insurance (line 6).
3 Trial insurance
In this section we evaluate the decision situation of P when he makes his
choice between dropping the case and pursuing it towards trial. Obviously,
the probability of prevailing plays a crucial role when facing this decision. We
derive the threshold values of this probability for an insured and an uninsured
plaintiﬀ. Furthermore, we derive the expected value of a trial for both types
of plaintiﬀs as well as for the defendant.
3.1 Trial value without insurance: j = n
If the plaintiﬀ does not have a trial insurance, then his expected payoﬀ from
proceeding to trial accrues to
8T
P
n = α(Y + C) · β · Y + β · [1 − α(Y + C)] · [X(Y + C) − C] − (1 − β)C
= β[α(Y + C) · (Y + C) + (1 − α(Y + C)) · X(Y + C)] − C (1)
T P
n denotes the expected value of a trial for an uninsured plaintiﬀ (indicated
by n for no insurance, and P for plaintiﬀ). If P prevails (with probability β)
in court, he cannot expect to receive the amount at stake with certainty. If
the defendant goes bankrupt, the probability of which is α(Y + C), P only
collects the defendant’s asset and still has to pay both parties’ litigation costs
C. The conditional expected value of the defendant’s asset is X(Y + C). If
D does not go bankrupt, which happens with a probability of 1−α(Y +C),
then P receives the amount at stake Y and beneﬁts from cost shifting.
Not to proceed to court yields a sure outcome of zero for both parties. The
risk-neutral, uninsured P will thus decide to go to court if T P




α(Y + C) · (Y + C) + [1 − α(Y + C)] · X(Y + C)
:= ˜ βn (2)
The denominator of the right-hand side of the above inequality is positive.
We deﬁne the right-hand side as ˜ βn, which represents the threshold value for
an uninsured plaintiﬀ. If the actual probability of prevailing in court, β, is
smaller than this threshold value, then P will certainly drop the case. This
is the condition for the trial to have positive expected value (PEV) in the
eyes of the plaintiﬀ.
3.2 Trial value with insurance: j = t
If P has trial insurance, he can disregard D’s bankruptcy risk when making
his decision whether to proceed to trial or not. This is the classical “trial vs.
settlement” decision situation.8 The expected trial value thus is
T
P
t = βY − (1 − β)C,
and P will proceed to trial if





3.3 Comparison of the results
In this section we compare the results of the two previous sections. The ﬁrst
observation is ˜ βt < ˜ βn, as the denominator of ˜ βn is smaller than that of ˜ βt:
Y + C > α(Y + C) · (Y + C) + [1 − α(Y + C)] · X(Y + C).
Recall that (Y + C) < Y + C and α ∈ [0,1]. Hence, the above expression is
always true. With respect to the exogenous parameter β, we therefore have
to distinguish three cases in our analysis:
• β > ˜ βn: The case has PEV with and without trial insurance.
• ˜ βn > β > ˜ βt: The case has PEV only if P has trial insurance, while the
expected value is negative (NEV) if P is uninsured.
• β < ˜ βt: Even with trial insurance, the case has NEV.
The second observation is, for the same reason, T P
t > T P
n . If P proceeds to
trial, then his expected payoﬀ is higher if he is insured.
3.4 Expected trial value for D
Finally, we evaluate the expected value of a trial for D. Note that this ex-
pected value is independent of whether the plaintiﬀ has trial insurance or
not. If P proceeds to court then D expects T D with
T
D = β · α(Y + C) · [X(Y + C) − (Y + C)] + (1 − β)X.
If D prevails (with a probability of 1 − β), then he enjoys the unconditional
expected value of the asset, X. If his opponent prevails in court, but D goes
bankrupt, then his payoﬀ is zero. In the third case, D retains the conditional
expected value X, but has to pay Y + C to the plaintiﬀ.
104 Settlement insurance
In this section, we apply the symmetric Nash bargaining solution9 and
demonstrate two results:
1. the Pareto frontier of the bargaining problem does not necessarily have
a negative slope;
2. a settlement insurance can decrease the settlement result.
4.1 Pareto frontier with positive slope
The ﬁrst result implies that the interests of the two players are not necessarily
opposed. In a zero-sum bargaining situation, the gain of player 1 is the loss
of player 2. Here, an increased settlement result increases the probability of
the defendant’s bankruptcy.
The symmetric Nash bargaining solution is denoted as ˆ Sij, with
ˆ Sij = argmax [πij − T
P
j ][δ − T
D].
πij denotes the bargaining result for the plaintiﬀ, where i ∈ {n;s} indicates
his settlement insurance status: i = s means that P is insured, while i = n
stands for not having settlement insurance. j ∈ {n;t} denotes the trial
insurance status of P, where j = t means that P is insured, while j = n
means no trial insurance. δ is the defendant’s settlement payoﬀ. T P
j and
T D represent the two parties’ respective outside options, as derived in the
previous section. Recall that T D is unaﬀected by P’s insurance status. T P
is only inﬂuenced by whether P has trial insurance or not, but unaﬀected by
his settlement insurance status. The defendant’s payoﬀs are independent of
P’s insurance decisions.10











9For an introduction to the derivation of settlement results, see Cooter/Rubinfeld
(1989).
10Compare tables 1 and 2.
11The slope of the Pareto frontier in a diagram that shows D’s payoﬀ on the











It is clear that each point on the Pareto frontier represents one speciﬁc value
of the settlement result S. E.g., if the parties agree that the plaintiﬀ should
receive the whole “cake”, this outcome would be represented by the intercept
of the Pareto frontier with the horizontal axis. If the parties share the “cake”,
this is represented by an interior point, and if D receives the whole agreement
rent, this would be represented by the intercept with the vertical axis.
Focusing on the decision to buy settlement insurance or not, we have to
distinguish the following bargaining payoﬀs for the two parties:
1. if P has purchased settlement insurance: πsj = Ssj,
2. if P is uninsured: πnj = α(Snj)X(Snj) + [1 − α(Snj)]Snj,
3. and for D: δ = [1 − α(Sij)][X(Sij) − Sij]
The third expression yields δ0 = −αS[X−S]+(1−α)[XS−1]. This is always
negative, due to X > S and XS < 1.
The ﬁrst expression, πnj, implies π0
sj = 1, which is positive. Thus, if P is
uninsured, then the slope of the Pareto frontier, as derived in equation (4),
is negative.
Now we turn to an insured plaintiﬀ. For the Pareto frontier to be positive,
the derivative of πsj with respect to S must be negative. This derivative is
αS(X − S) + α(XS − 1) + 1. This derivative has an ambiguous sign; it is
negative if
αS(S − X) > 1 − α + αXS.
Since the right-hand side of this inequality is positive, parameter constel-
lations may exist which fulﬁll this condition. This proves our ﬁrst result:
the slope of the Pareto frontier can, unlike in settlement problems without
bankruptcy and BDLI, be positive.
124.2 Settlement insurance may decrease settlement
The second result points to a remarkable diﬀerence between trial and settle-
ment BDLI. While trial insurance increases the settlement result, settlement
insurance may have just the opposite eﬀect. In the following, we derive the
conditions under which this surprising result is possible.
In the case i = n (P does not have settlement insurance), the bargaining











! = 0 (5)
In the other case i = s (P holds a settlement insurance), the bargaining










! = 0 (6)
We want to derive the conditions under which ˆ Ssj < ˆ Snj is true. If this holds,









0(Snj) > δ(Snj) − T
D + δ
0(Snj)Snj (7)
Recall that πsj(Ssj) = Ssj, hence π0
sj = 1. Figure 3 visualizes the case in
which condition (7) is satisﬁed. It maps the respective values of the Nash
products Nij for an insured and an uninsured plaintiﬀ. Obviously, in this
case the settlement result with insurance (ˆ Ssj) is smaller than without (ˆ Ssj),
as the Nash products are concave. The bargaining result (ˆ Sij) maximizes
the respective Nash product. Then it becomes clear that the slope of the
Nash product for the insured plaintiﬀ must be negative at the position of the
bargaining result with the uninsured plaintiﬀ. The value of the Nash product
at this position is indicated by the black dot in ﬁgure 3. Hence, we have to
ﬁnd the conditions under which the derivative of Nsj at the position ˆ Snj is
negative in order to know the conditions for ˆ Ssj < ˆ Snj.
ˆ Snj fulﬁlls equation (5), which implies
11We owe the idea for this proof to Anja Olbrich.












0(ˆ Snj) = π
0
nj(ˆ Snj)[δ(ˆ Snj) − T
D] + δ
0(ˆ Snj)πnj(ˆ Snj)










which is equivalent to
[π
0
sj(ˆ Snj) − π
0
nj(ˆ Snj)][δ(ˆ Snj) − T
D] < −δ
0(ˆ Snj)[πsj(ˆ Snj) − πnj(ˆ Snj)] (8)
If condition (8) is satisﬁed, then the settlement result with insurance is lower
than the result without insurance: ˆ Ssj < ˆ Snj. The left-hand side of condition
(8) is always positive. The condition, therefore, cannot be fulﬁlled should
δ0 be positive (in this case, the interests of the bargaining parties are not
strictly opposed, see result 1).
Thus, we have derived an important relation between the two results to be
demonstrated in this section: if result 1 holds, result 2 cannot be fulﬁlled -
the bargaining outcome is greater if the plaintiﬀ is insured.
However, with a negative value of δ0, the diﬀerence in brackets on the right-
hand side only needs to be “large enough” in order to fulﬁll condition (8).
The exact condition for “large enough” is
14ˆ Snj − πnj(ˆ Snj) >
[1 − π0
nj(ˆ Snj)][δ(ˆ Snj) − T D]
−δ0(ˆ Snj)
(9)
where the right-hand side is positive. Condition (9) is hard to interpret, but
our goal was only to prove the second result: conditions exist under which
the purchase of settlement insurance decreases the settlement result. This
is the case when condition (9) is fulﬁlled. Then, a settlement insurance is
no “strategic insurance”; there exists no mutual gain for the insurer and the
insured if both are risk-neutral.
5 Conclusion
We have added two amendments to a simple model of settlement and trial
(with complete and perfect information): the possibility of bankruptcy, and
the option to buy bad debt loss insurance to cover the bankruptcy risk after
both settlement and trial. The amended model allows us to show that trial
insurance has two eﬀects and therefore is a “strategic insurance”:
• In a case where the trial has a positive expected value for the plaintiﬀ
even without insurance, the purchase of trial insurance increases the
settlement result which the prospective litigants agree upon.
• If the case has a negative expected value without insurance, then the
threat to sue is not credible and no settlement occurs. Purchasing
trial insurance may then induce a positive expected value and, thereby,
make the trial threat credible.
Note that the insurer will not have to make any payment at all, as the case is
settled in both of the above cases. Thus, a cooperation rent between insurer
and plaintiﬀ exists which is based only on the exploitation eﬀect of trial
insurance during settlement negotiations. A third case exists in which the
expected trial value is negative even when the plaintiﬀ is insured. In this
case, it makes no sense at all to purchase trial insurance.
The analysis of settlement insurance leads to rather diﬀerent results. The
possibility of bankruptcy decreases the expected value of a settlement agree-
ment. Thus, the uninsured plaintiﬀ would demand a higher share of the
bargaining rent than in negotiations without a bankruptcy risk. Settlement
15insurance, however, may have the opposite eﬀect. We have derived the con-
dition under which a plaintiﬀ with settlement insurance is satisﬁed even with
a lower bargaining result than without settlement insurance. In such a case,
there is no mutual beneﬁt for the insurer and the risk-neutral plaintiﬀ. Settle-
ment insurance might still generate a beneﬁt when plaintiﬀs are risk averse,
but it can certainly not be qualiﬁed as a strategic insurance.
Moreover, constellations exist under which the interests of the plaintiﬀ and
the defendant (concerning an increase in the settlement award) are not per-
fectly opposed. Thus, the impact of insurance on bargaining situations de-
serves future research.
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